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I. INTRODUCTION
A group of minors allegedly attacked a nine-year-old girl at a San
Francisco beach and "artificially raped" her with a bottle. The minors
attacked the girl after watching and discussing a television network
movie that portrayed a similar rape. The victim sued the network,
claiming that it was negligent in airing the program.'
In Miami Beach, a teenage boy shot and killed his eighty-three-
year-old neighbor. Following his conviction, the minor sued three televi-
sion networks for damages, alleging that a decade of viewing extensive
television violence had incited him to imitate the acts that he had seen.2
Nineteen-year-old John McCollum was listening to Ozzy Os-
bourne's "Speak of the Devil" album on his headphones when he shot
himself in the head. The album included a song entitled "Suicide Solu-
tion." John's parents sued Osbourne and the record producer, alleging
that Osbourne's music proximately caused John's death by preaching
that life is filled with despair and suicide is the only way out.3
1. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
2. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
3. McCollum v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
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Public reaction to these unsuccessful lawsuits has sparked a new
movement. Some state legislatures are passing statutes that restrict mi-
nors' access to violent video cassettes, books, and other forms of expres-
sion. Vendors of expressive material have challenged Missouri 4 and
Tennessee' violence statutes. Colorado recently has passed similar re-
strictions on the dissemination of such material despite the uncertain
constitutional status of these regulations.'
The emergence of violence statutes raises questions concerning the
future of freedom of speech in the United States. This Note explores
the implications of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence for validating or invalidating violence statutes. Part II discusses
the recent passage of violence acts and the reasoning two courts have
applied in declaring the regulations unconstitutional. Part III examines
the Supreme Court's approach to obscenity regulations, which served as
the impetus for the development of Court-imposed restrictions on free-
dom of speech. Part IV compares and contrasts regulations on obscene
speech and violent speech by first examining a proper First Amendment
inquiry, and then applying Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analy-
sis to restrictions on speech. Part V discusses the states' purported in-
terests in upholding morality, preventing the incitement of their
citizens toward crime, and protecting children, as they apply to regula-
tions on violent speech. Part VI addresses the problem of providing ad-
equate procedural safeguards in statutes that restrict expression. This
Note concludes that even though states may have a stronger constitu-
tional basis for regulating violent material than they have for restricting
obscene expression, current violence statutes violate the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.
II. VIOLENCE STATUTES
Missouri's violence act regulates the sale and rental of violent video
cassettes to minors.' The Act requires video dealers to keep videos in a
4. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.090 (Supp. 1992).
5. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-901 to 39-17-914 (1991).
6. See 1992 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-601.
7. The statute provides:
1. Video cassettes or other video reproduction devices, or the jackets, cases or coverings of
such video reproduction devices shall be displayed or maintained in a separate area .,. if:
(1) Taken as a whole and applying contemporary community standards, the average person
would find that it has a tendency to cater or appeal to morbid interest in violence for persons
under the age of seventeen; and
(2) It depicts violence in a way which is patently offensive to the average person applying
contemporary adult community standards with respect to what is suitable for persons under
the age of seventeen; and
(3) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for persons
under the age of seventeen.
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separate area if the dealers determine that their content or their cover
is violent expression as defined by the statute's three-part test., Fur-
ther, the Act strictly forbids dealers from selling or renting these videos
to minors.9 In enacting the three-pronged analysis for triggering the
statutory requirements, the Missouri legislature essentially applied the
Supreme Court's obscenity test, enunciated in Miller v. California,0 to
violent expression."
A violation of this statute is an "infraction,' 1 2 which under Mis-
souri law is not a crime' s but may result in a fine.' 4 Video dealers 5
initiated a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act, claiming it unconstitu-
tionally restricts the sale and rental of violent videos.' 6
In Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster 7 the district
court enjoined state authorities from enforcing the Act, declaring the
statute's provisions unconstitutional on their face. 18 Recently, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed,'9 holding the Act unconstitutional on three
2. Any video cassettes or other video reproduction devices meeting the description in subsec-
tion 1 of this section shall not be rented or sold to a person under the age of seventeen years.
3. Any violation of the provisions of subsection 1 or 2 of this section shall be punishable as an
infraction...
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.090 (Supp. 1992).
8. Id. § 573.090.1. The statutory three-part test is set forth in note 7.
9. Id. § 573.090.2.
10. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court stated:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
11. See note 7 and accompanying text.
12. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.090.3 (Supp. 1992).
13. According to Missouri law:
1. An offense defined by this code or by any other statute of this state constitutes an "infrac-
tion" if it is so designated or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other
civil penalty is authorized upon conviction.
2. An infraction does not constitute a crime and conviction of an infraction shall not give rise
to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.
Id. § 556.021 (1979) (emphasis added). However, the fact that this statute falls within the Chapter
entitled "Crimes and Punishment" persuaded the Eighth Circuit to find the statute "quasi-crimi-
nal." See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992), and notes 32
to 34 and accompanying text.
14. The fine may not exceed $200. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560.016.1(4) (1979).
15. Three groups actually initiated the challenge: (i) video dealer associations; (ii) the Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc. (including movie producers and distributors); and (iii) the
owners of two Missouri video retail stores. Webster, 968 F.2d at 687. This Note collectively refers
to these challengers as "video dealers."
16. Id. at 687.
17. 773 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Mo. 1991), aft'd, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
18. Id. at 1277-80.
19. 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
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grounds. First, the court applied strict scrutiny analysis and held that
the Act is not narrowly drawn to promote a compelling state interest.
20
The statute's proponents (hereinafter "Missouri") argued that violent
videos are "obscene" for a child audience, and therefore the court
should apply a lower level of scrutiny to the statute 1.2  The court re-
jected Missouri's characterization of the videos as obscene, and declared
that expression is obscene only if it depicts sexual conduct.2 The court
explained that since the statute discriminated against expression based
on its content,23 it was subject to strict scrutiny.2 4 The Missouri statute
did not identify clearly the material that would be subject to the regula-
tions, and thus it was unconstitutional on its face for not being nar-
rowly drawn. 5
Second, the court found the Act unconstitutionally vague,26 since it
does not clearly identify which expression triggers- its requirements.
While the Missouri legislature attempted to avoid such a challenge by
adopting Miller's obscenity test,27 Miller still requires that either the
statute specifically define the proscribed expression or the state courts
develop a definition. 8 In this instance the Missouri courts would not be
able to delineate a proper definition because the legislature failed to
enunciate a purpose behind the statute and no legislative history is
available. 29 Furthermore, courts should not require video dealers to de-
fend prosecutions so that the courts may develop the statute's
meaning."
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held that the Act unconstitutionally im-
poses strict liability on video dealers.3 1 The court found that the statute
20. Id. at 688-89.
21. Id. at 688. See Part III for a discussion of the regulation of obscene speech.
22. 968 F.2d at 688 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
23. Id. at 689. See also notes 93 to 98 and accompanying text.
24. 968 F.2d at 689. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 46, 48 (1987) (noting that the standard applied to content based regulations is some formula-
tion of "compelling governmental interest," "absolute protection," or "clear and present danger").
25. 968 F.2d at 689. The statute has no legislative history, nor did the legislature articulate a
purpose behind the Act's provisions. Id. at 687. While one commentator concluded that the statute
was designed to regulate "slasher" movies, see Kenneth D. Rozell, Comment, Missouri Statute
Attacks "Violent" Videos: Are First Amendment Rights in Danger?, 10 Loy. Ent. L. J. 655, 655
(1990), the court stated that the statute's language showed no such intent. 968 F.2d at 689.
26. 968 F.2d at 689-90.
27. See note 10 and accompanying text.
28. 968 F.2d at 690.
29. Id. See note 25 and accompanying text.
30. The court declared:
We believe the Missouri courts could only define the prohibited expression on a video-by-
video basis. Video dealers "are entitled to be free of the burdens of defending prosecutions,
however expeditious, aimed at hammering out the structure of the statute piecemeal."
968 F.2d at 690 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965)).
31. Id. at 690-91.
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is "quasi-criminal, ' 32 and that a court may impose a criminal penalty
for disseminating speech only when the statute requires that the video
dealer have knowledge of the video's contents.3 3 This Act creates too
great a danger that video dealers will engage in self-censorship.3 "
The Tennessee legislature passed a statute35 similar to the one at
32. Id. at 690. A violation of the statute is technically not a crime, but the statute is located
in the "Crimes and Punishment" chapter of the Missouri Code. See also note 13.
33. 968 F.2d at 690.
34. The court stated:
By penalizing video dealers regardless of their knowledge of a video's contents, the statute
presents a hazard of self-censorship. To comply with the statute, all video dealers would have
to view the contents of every video in their stores. Dealers would limit videos available to the
public to videos the dealers have viewed. This would impede rental and sale of all videos,
including those that the statute does not purport to regulate and that the First Amendment
fully protects. Because the statute's strict liability feature would make video dealers more
reluctant to exercise their freedom of speech and ultimately restrict the public's access to
constitutionally protected videos, the statute violates the First Amendment.
Id. at 690-91.
35. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-901 to 39-17-920 (1991). The statute provides:
Sale, loan or exhibition of material to minors.-(a) It is unlawful for any.person to
knowingly sell or loan for monetary consideration or otherwise exhibit or make available to a
minor:
(1) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual
representation or image of a person or portion of the human body, which depicts nudity,
sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors; or
(2) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however reproduced, or sound record-
ing, which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (a)(1), or which contains explicit
and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct,
excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly exhibit to a minor for monetary considera-
tion, or to knowingly sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or otherwise admit a minor to
premises whereon there is exhibited a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in
whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse,
and which is harmful to minors.
(c) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id. § 39-17-911. The statute also covers display for sale or rental:
Display for sale or rental of material harmful to minors.-(a) It is unlawful for a person
to display for sale or rental a visual depiction, including a videocassette tape or film, or a
written representation, including a book, magazine or pamphlet, which contains material
harmful to minors anywhere minors are lawfully admitted.
(b) The state has the burden of proving that the material is displayed. Material is not
considered displayed under this section if:
(1) The material is:
(A) Placed in 'binder racks' that cover the lower two thirds (2/3) of the material and
the viewable one third ('1/) is not harmful to minors;
(B) Located at a height of not less than five and one half feet (5.5') from the floor;
and
(C) Reasonable steps are taken to prevent minors from perusing the material;
(2) The material is sealed, and, if it contains material on its cover which is harmful to
minors, it must also be opaquely wrapped;
(3) The material is placed out of sight underneath the counter; or
(4) The material is located so that the material is not open to view by minors and is
located in an area restricted to adults;
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issue in Webster. Among other prohibited material, 6 Tennessee's Act
prohibits the knowing 7 display, sale, or rental of videos, books, or any
other printed matter or visual representations that depict "excess vio-
lence"38 and are "harmful to minors."3 " A violation of the Tennessee
Act is a misdemeanor. 40
In Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter,41 retail booksellers42
initiated a First Amendment challenge to the statute, claiming it is un-
constitutionally overbroad. 4' The booksellers argued that the statute
would prevent constitutionally protected material from reaching the
public since the only alternatives left open to booksellers would be to
remove all "harmful to minors" works from display, construct "adults
only" sections, or prohibit minors from entering their stores alto-
gether.44 The booksellers claimed that they would have to determine
(c) A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor for each day the person is in
violation of this section.
Id. § 39-17-914.
36. The Act prohibits the sale, loan, or exhibition of material depicting nudity, sexual con-
duct, or sado-masochistic abuse if the material is harmful to minors. Id. § 39-17-911(a).
37. Unlike the Missouri statute, a person must knowingly sell, loan, or exhibit such material
to a minor. Id. § 39-17-911. This avoids the strict liability problem present in Webster. See notes
31 to 34 and accompanying text.
38. The Tennessee statute defines "excess violence" as the "depiction of acts of violence in
such a graphic and/or bloody manner as to exceed common limits of custom and candor, or in such
a manner that it is apparent that the predominant appeal of the material is portrayal of violence
for violence's sake." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-901(4) (1991).
39. The Tennessee statute defines the term "harmful to minors" to mean:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual excite-
ment, sexual conduct, excess violence or sado-masochistic abuse when the matter or
performance:
(A) Would be found by the average person applying contemporary community standards
to appeal predominantly to the prurient, shameful or morbid interests of minors;
(B) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable for minors; and
(C) Taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific values for
minors.
Id. § 39-17-901(6).
"Minor" is defined as "any person who has not reached eighteen (18) years of age and is not
emancipated." Id. § 39-17-901(8).
40. A violation of the display provisions is a Class C misdemeanor, id. § 39-17-914(c), punish-
able by no more than 30 days imprisonment, a $50 fine, or both, id. § 40-35-111(e)(3). A violation
of the knowing sale, loan, or exhibition provision is a Class A misdemeanor, id. § 39-17-911(c),
punishable by no more than a year's imprisonment, $2500, or both, id. § 40-35-111(e)(1). Unlike
the Missouri court, the Tennessee court did not find an issue as to whether a violation constitutes
a crime. Compare notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
41. No. 90-1893-III (I) (Tenn. Chanc. Feb. 14, 1992). Appeal is pending.
42. The plaintiffs are owners of retail book stores, book distributors, and publishing trade
associations. Id.; slip op. at 1. This Note collectively refers to these plaintiffs as "booksellers."
43. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 20; Davis-Kidd (No. 90-1893-III(1)).
44. Id. at 25.
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which material should not be available to the general public, under fear
of criminal prosecution for making a mistake.45
The Tennessee Chancery Court partially invalidated the statute."
The court struck down the Act's application to material depicting ex-
cess violence.47 The court did not hold that violent expression can never
be regulated, but rather found the Act's definition of excess violence
unconstitutionally vague.48 The Act would require each bookseller to
exercise his or her subjective judgment as to which materially is exces-
sively violent, without any guidance from the statute itself.49 However,
the court upheld the requirement that those selling expressive material
maintain separate displays50 for any material fitting the Act's definition
of "harmful to minors," once the excess violence provision is deleted. 1
The court held that requiring restrictions on the displays is a proper
exercise of Tennessee's police power and is not an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech.52 The Tennessee Supreme Court will hear the
booksellers' argument on appeal.53
III. REGULATION OF OBSCENE SPEECH
In the United States, freedom of speech does not mean freedom to
say anything at any time and in any place. 4 The Supreme Court has
defined certain classes of speech for which the First Amendment pro-
vides no protection. These include speech that is obscene, libelous, pro-
fane, or which incites a breach of the peace. 5  The rationales behind the
Supreme Court's obscenity jurisprudence demonstrate the shaky foun-
dation on which First Amendment freedoms rest. The obscenity cases
45. Id.
46. Davis-Kidd, slip op. at 12.
47. Id. at 8-9.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-914.
51. Davis-Kidd, slip op. at 9-10, 12.
52. Id. at 10.
53. When this Note went to press, the Tennessee Supreme Court had not yet decided the
case. See note 41.
54. See Rowan v. Post Office Dept, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (declaring that there is no constitu-
tional right to mail erotic material to an unwilling recipient); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (upholding sanction on a radio station that broadcast indecent speech in the afternoon);
Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding that the FCC may regulate
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages).
55. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
1993]
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also provide a basis for determining the constitutionality of the violence
acts.
In the 1940s New York enacted a statute purporting to regulate
"obscene prints and articles." 56 The New York legislature passed this
Act in order to prevent the incitement of violent crimes.57 In Winters v.
New York, 5s a bookseller challenged the constitutionality of the statute
after he was convicted of selling magazines that allegedly would incite
readers to commit criminal acts. The Supreme Court recognized that a
state has an interest in reducing the incitement of its citizens to commit
criminal acts, and that it may exercise its police powers to achieve this
end. However, the Court struck down the statute, stating that publica-
tions of no value to society warrant as much First Amendment protec-
tion as those considered classics. 9
The Winters Court seemed to give broad meaning to the right to
freedom of speech. The Court, however, indicated that states may justi-
fiably regulate acts injurious to the public morals60 as long as they do
not violate the Constitution in the process. In later cases, this aspect of
the opinion actually undermined a broad interpretation of freedom of
speech.'1
In Roth v. United States62 the Supreme Court reversed its stance
regarding the role of expressive material's "value." At issue in Roth
were a federal statute that made it a crime to mail obscene material,
56. See N.Y. Penal Law § 1141 (Consol. 1941). The statute provided:
1. A person ... who,
2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes, or shows, or has in his posses-
sion with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan,
gift or distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted
to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of
criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime; ... [i]s guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id. (emphasis added), quoted in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948). Note that the only
reference to obscenity is in the title of the Act: "Obscene Prints and Articles."
57. See Winters, 333 U.S. at 511-14.
58. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
59. Id. at 510.
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press
applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is
too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propa-
ganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we
can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled
to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 515.
61. See notes 160-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the regulation of "immoral"
speech and the role this alleged governmental interest is playing in the passage of the violence
acts.
62. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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and a Massachusetts statute that made selling obscene material a crimi-
nal offense. 3 The Court declared these regulations constitutional.
While the Court began by stating that the First Amendment, as writ-
ten, is an unconditional grant of free speech, it claimed that this was
not the actual intent of the Framers in drafting the amendment. 4 The
Roth Court, in direct contradiction to the Winters Court, 5 declared
that the First Amendment has a purpose, which is to allow the free
exchange of ideas so that people can bring about desired political and
social changes."
Once the Court defines a purpose behind the constitutional grant
of free speech, it may limit any speech that does not thereby comport
with the articulated intent. By declaring the purpose behind the First
Amendment, the Roth Court paved the way for courts to carve out ex-
ceptions to both the freedom to speak and the corresponding freedom
to receive information. The constitutional propriety of developing
such a list of exceptions is questionable.6
The Roth Court's test for determining when expression is protected
under the First Amendment asks whether the speech at issue has any
social importance.6 9 If any such importance exists, the expression is
protected.7 0 Roth holds that obscenity has absolutely no social impor-
tance and, therefore, states may regulate it without any constitutional
infirmity. While in one breath the Court stated that the Constitution
fully protects unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, and even ideas gen-
erally hateful to prevailing community opinion,7' in the next breath it
declared that obscenity is socially unimportant because many nations
and most of the American states traditionally have enacted laws
prohibiting obscene publications. 7' The Court contradicted itself by
claiming that a majority determination of which expression is constitu-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 483.
65. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan wrote the opinions of the Court in both
Winters and Roth.
66. 354 U.S. at 484. Compare this declaration to the Court's statement in Winters: "We do
not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only
to the exposition of ideas." 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
67. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)
(holding that the First Amendment's protection extends to a communication, its source, and to its
recipients). See also McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 989.
68. See notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
69. 354 U.S. at 484.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Court stated:
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the univer-
sal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of
1993]
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tionally protected is inconsistent with the First Amendment, yet al-
lowing a majority's determination of what is "socially important"
speech accomplish the same objective.73 This defective constitutional
analysis of free expression is what the Framers specifically sought to
avoid,74 and becomes a recurrent problem with the passage of violence
acts.75
After Roth, Supreme Court opinions no longer questioned the idea
that the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech. The Court
instead turned its focus to refining the definition of obscene. In Miller
v. California,76 the Court set forth the obscenity test that is still in ef-
fect today." The Court specifically rejected its previous conclusion that
speech is protected unless it is utterly without redeeming social value.7 8
Instead, the Court determined that the First Amendment only protects
expression that has serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.79
The Court's decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.80 continued
the erosion of First Amendment protection into the 1990s. In Barnes,
an Indiana indecency law required that barroom dancers at least wear
pasties and a G-string. Two establishments sued to enjoin enforcement
of the law so that they could provide completely nude dancing as en-
tertainment. While the Supreme Court recognized that nude dancing is
a form of expression, it declared that it was symbolic speech and there-
fore not entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.8 1
The Barnes case represents the erosion of established First Amend-
ment freedoms in two ways. First, the Court has continued to assert
that the government has a valid interest in achieving "morality"
through legislation. 2 While morality may be a proper basis for the state
over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted
by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.
Id. at 484-85 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 485-86.
74. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (Blackmun concurring)
(invalidating convictions for offering live nude dancing as a form of entertainment).
75. See Part V.A.
76. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
77. Id. at 24. The Miller test is cited in note 10. Compare Missouri's violence statute cited in
note 7 and accompanying text.
78. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966).
79. 413 U.S. at 23.
80. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). See Zachary T. Fardon, Recent Development, Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc.: Nude Dancing and the First Amendment Question, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 237 (1992), for
a critique of the Barnes decision.
81. 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61. The Barnes Court determined that its opinion in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), held that symbolic speech is less protected than purely expressive
speech.
82. See 111 S. Ct. at 2461-63.
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to define certain conduct as illegal, such as murder, it is an insufficient
rationale to suppress expression. If a state or court is permitted to
define whether speech has "value" based on prevailing notions of mo-
rality, the view of the majority determines what others may express,
whether through speech, writing, or body language. 4
Second, the Barnes Court makes a distinction between expression
and expressive conduct, 5 and declares that incidental restrictions on
expression are permissible if the regulation of the conduct furthers sub-
stantial governmental interests.86 Such a distinction is constitutionally
sound, 7 but only if the definition of conduct is approached carefully in
order to prevent actual expression from becoming unprotected and sub-
ject to extensive regulation.88
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S FREEDOM OF SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
An examination of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence shows that
the Court applies a two-tiered analysis in determining whether a state
has restricted expression unconstitutionally. The first tier requires an
examination of the First Amendment itself. This examination involves a
consideration of the alleged expression involved and the alleged uncon-
stitutional violation of the freedom to disseminate or receive a particu-
lar message. The second tier requires the Court to inquire into the
83. See Part V.A.
84. Id.
85. 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
86. Id. at 2461. The Court quoted United States v. O'Brien:
[E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the
destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has
held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of con-
duct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of
the governmental interest which must appear, the. Court has employed a variety of descriptive
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever impreci-
sion inheres in these terms we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justi-
fied if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. (quoting 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted)).
87. Compare United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (holding that flag burning as
a mode of expression enjoys full First Amendment protection) with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966) (holding that demonstrations on premises of city jail are not speech but conduct, and do
not deserve full First Amendment protection). The expression versus conduct debate is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion concerning drawing the line between conduct and expression,
see Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
467 (1984).
88. Note that the Barnes Court does find nude dancing to be expressive conduct, albeit "only
marginally so." 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
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procedures the state used in the deprivation of expression and ask
whether the procedures are inadequate under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. First Amendment Analysis
The First Amendment 89 grants freedom of speech and of the press.
An ongoing debate9 exists as to whether courts ever may permit states
to limit the freedom of speech constitutionally. Textualists argue that
the Amendment's mandate that "no law" shall abridge the freedom of
speech means what it says.91 In contrast, those attempting to divine the
framers' intent believe that the only expression that states may not
abridge constitutionally is that which implicates the First Amendment's
purposes.9"
The proposition that the government may not discriminate against
expression based on its content is relatively uncontroversial. 9 Content-
based restrictions on speech are direct censorship 4 because they pro-
hibit the public from receiving communications based on the state's re-
action to the message's content. Whether a regulation is content-based
depends on whether the limitation on expressive material targets a
communication because of the message it conveys.95
'The violence acts are clearly content-based. The Missouri act regu-
lates video cassettes, while the Tennessee act regulates video cassettes,
tapes, films, or any written representations.96 It is beyond question that
these are forms of expression that the First Amendment protects. 7
89. According to the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." U.S. Const., Amend. I.
90. Compare Douglas N. Husak, What is so Special About [Free] Speech?, 4 Law & Phil. 1
(1985) (arguing that freedom of speech is not a special right, and that states are warranted in
limiting it) with Sol Wachtler, Right to Free Speech as a Cherished Heritage, 201 N.Y. L. J. 37
(Jan. 18, 1989) (arguing that the right to freedom of speech is unique).
91. For a discussion of textualist theory, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coher-
ence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1195-98 (1987).
92. The purposes that are the most often articulated as those the Framers intended the First
Amendment to serve are truth and political participation. See Eric Hoffman, Feminism, Pornogra-
phy, and Law, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 499-500 (1985); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 20 (1971). For a more expansive view of the
purpose of the First Amendment, see Thomas Irwin Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expres-
sion 6-7 (Random House, 1970); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 990-91 (1978).
93. See Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 55 (cited in note 24).
94. See id. at 54-57.
95. Id. at 47.
96. See notes 7 and 35 and accompanying text.
97. "The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the circulation of books
as well as their publication . . ." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64-65 n.6. This is
true whether the expressive activity is noncommercially motivated or commercially motivated.
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Since the regulations only apply to expression that meets the statutory
definition of violent,98 the two Acts regulate the content of these forms
of expression.
The violence statutes apply a "variable" definition 9 of vio-
lence-they divide the country into two worlds according to age.100
Thus, courts must explore two possible ways in which the states may be
censoring protected material. First, the violence acts may directly cen-
sor statutorily-defined violent expressions as applied to minors. Second,
they may censor the same material as applied to adults.
The purpose behind the violence acts is apparent on the face of the
legislation-preventing minors' access to these expressions. Therefore,
Missouri and Tennessee have directly censored minors' access to violent
material. The Supreme Court has declared that not all forms of censor-
ship are unconstitutional,101 but the Court has established a rebuttable
presumption that prior restraints violate the First Amendment. 02 Since
the violence acts implicate minors' First Amendment rights, the Court
must turn to the second tier of its analysis. Under this tier, the regula-
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02
(1952).
98. In Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, the district court stated:
Plaintiffs argue that the challenged provisions are a form of unconstitutional censorship
because restrictions are placed on the dissemination of video cassettes based solely on their
content. The kind of expression recorded on a particular video cassette determines whether it
must be kept in a "separate area" and whether it can be rented or sold to a person under 17
years of age....
Defendants do not dispute that the Act restricts the dissemination of certain video cassettes
based on their content.
773 F. Supp. at 1277.
99. Similarly, in Ginsberg v. New York the Supreme Court upheld a statute that applied a
more stringent definition of obscenity to minors than that applied to adults. 390 U.S. 629, 635-37
(1968). The Court adopted a lower court's declaration that a variable definition of obscenity was
useful in analyzing regulations aimed at limiting the availability of expressive material for minors
but not adults. Id.
100. The Missouri statute used age 17 as the cut-off, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.090(2) (Supp.
1992), while Tennessee placed it at age 18, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-901(8) (1991).
101. See, for example, Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (holding that prior
submission of movies to a censorship board is not necessarily unconstitutional); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (stating that "[l]iberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an
absolute right").
102. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70. The Court stated that: "[a]ny system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity." Id. The Court also noted:
Nothing in the Court's opinion in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, is inconsistent
with the Court's traditional attitude of disfavor toward prior restraints of expression. The
only question tendered to the Court in that case was whether a prior restraint was necessarily
unconstitutional under all circumstances. In declining to hold prior restraints unconstitu-
tional per se, the Court did not uphold the constitutionality of any specific such restraint.
Furthermore, the holding was expressly confined to motion pictures.
Id. at 70 n.10. See also Near, 283 U.S. at 716; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).
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tions can only survive Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny if they are ap-
propriately tailored.10 3
The censorship of expression with respect to adults is less apparent
in the passage of the violence statutes, but is present nonetheless.
Courts have referred to this form of restraint as informal censorship or
self-censorship, 10 4 but regardless of the label, the effect is the same. De-
spite the legislators' intentions, regulations that implement prior re-
straints as to youths may also result in a reduction in the quantity and
quality of the regulated material that is available to adults. In Smith v.
California05 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Los Ange-
les statute that imposed strict criminal liability on booksellers who pos-
sessed obscene material. The Court declared that such a statute would
have the unconstitutional effect of inhibiting constitutionally protected
expression.1°6 Such informal censorship may have even more constitu-
tional infirmities than direct censorship due to the fewer procedural
safeguards generally present.107
Informal censorship deprives adult readers, viewers, and listeners
of the opportunity to purchase expression that they have a constitu-
tional right to receive. 10 8 States, therefore, must consider carefully the
Supreme Court's warning that such legislation impermissibly may "re-
duce the adult population.., to reading only what is fit for children"'
10 9
before they enact statutes restricting expression.
The Court has declared that, with certain exceptions, all speech is
constitutionally protected." 0 The Court defines these unprotected ex-
103. See Part IV.B.
104. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 67 (involving informal censorship); Smith, 361 U.S. at
151, 154 (involving "self-imposed restriction of free expression" and "self-censorship"); Freedman,
380 U.S. at 59 (involving discouraging effect on the exhibitor).
105. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
106. According to the Court:
Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the con-
tents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an
approach to omniscience. And the bookseller's burden would become the public's burden, for
by restricting him the public's access to reading matter would be restricted. If the contents of
bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material that the owner had inspected,
these shops and stands may very well become depleted. The physical limitations on the book-
seller's ability to become familiar with every item for sale coupled with his timidity in the
face of absolute criminal liability would tend to restrict indirectly the public's access to read-
ing material which the State could not constitutionally restrict directly. The bookseller's self-
censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly
less offensive for being privately administered. Through this indirect restriction, the distribu-
tion of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.
Id. at 143-54. See also Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
107. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66.
108. Id. at 71.
109. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
110. See note 18 and accompanying text.
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ceptions on a case-by-case basis. Since the Court has not yet found that
violent speech is unprotected,111 courts considering the constitutionality
of violence acts must reason that they regulate protected expression. 112
The Supreme Court creates exceptions to the First Amendment by clas-
sifying certain speech as "low value"" 3 expression, thereby making it
either completely unprotected by the Constitution or deserving of less
protection. By placing values on speech, the Court makes itself the final
arbiter as to which speech has a high value and is thus permissible for
American society. While not all speech may deserve constitutional pro-
tection, classifying the content of such expression as "obscene" or "vio-
lent" is unconstitutional content-based discrimination, and is
dependent upon the subjective values of nine unelected justices." 4 The
result is that only the Supreme Court can determine whether particular
expression has value; any such moralizing by the state or federal gov-
ernments is unconstitutional censorship.
In Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System," 5 the district court
recognized the proper limitations on the ability of courts to make First
Amendment value judgments. The plaintiff, a minor, sued the television
networks after he killed his eighty-three-year-old neighbor, claiming
that he had become desensitized and addicted to violence after a ten-
year period of watching network programming."16 The court warned
that both the courts and the legislatures have a limited ability to set
the standards for determining depictions of violence." 7
In Zamora, the plaintiff did not seek an injunction against violent
programming, but rather sought damages for any harm such program-
111. See Webster, 773 F. Supp. at 1278.
112. Id.
113. See Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 47 (cited in note 24).
114. In analyzing Miller's obscenity test, one commentator notes that the court's determina-
tions are:
aesthetic because their resolution requires analysis and judgment of the content of images and
its effect on an audience. Liberal Justices and commentators tend to place aesthetic judg-
ments beyond the scope of the judiciary's proper role in the determination of first amendment
issues. Yet, there is little doubt that judges consciously make such judgments in the realm of
obscenity law.
Hoffman, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 502-03 (foonotes omitted) (cited in note 92).
115. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
116. The court noted that two rights are involved in such a case: the right of the broadcaster
to disseminate messages, and the right of the public to receive them. Id. at 205.
117. The Court declared:
[T]his Court lacks the legal and institutional capacity to identify isolated depictions of
violence, let alone the ability to set the standard for media dissemination of items containing
'violence' in one form or the other .... The point here, of course, is that improper judicial
limitation of first amendment rights is as offensive as unwarranted legislative incursion into
that area.
Id. at 203-04 (footnotes omitted).
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ming allegedly caused. Plaintiffs have brought several cases along simi-
lar lines,1 ' but only one such plaintiff has ever been successful." 9 This
low success rate is due to the courts' focus on the effect that damage
claims would have on the disseminators of such expression. The courts
have generally found that self-censorship would result and the First
Amendment would effectively die.2 0 Broadcasters would err on the side
of releasing less expression to the public for fear of incurring liability in
close cases. In the cases involving violence statutes, booksellers and
video dealers presumably would do the same.
In the obscenity cases, one overriding question is what is obscenity,
and who defines it.12' With obscenity, the issue becomes a moral deci-
sion based on a majority-imposed system of values or a judge-made sys-
tem of values 22 that inhibit the minority's freedom of speech.
Similarly, unless a Fourteenth Amendment ends-means analysis is ap-
plied to the violence statutes, a moral issue will also exist regarding
what a majority of the population considers to be violent expression
and what material the state should suppress for the general welfare.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
After concluding that the First Amendment is implicated, the court
must determine whether and under what conditions a state may limit
protected expression. The conclusion the court reaches will depend first
and foremost upon the court's view of the First Amendment's role in
American society. Some commentators and courts'23 argue that the
118. See Shannon v. Walt Disney Prod., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 276
S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981) (involving an 11-year-old who placed a large piece of lead into a balloon,
after watching a sound effect demonstration on the "Mickey Mouse Club" on television and was
partially blinded when the balloon burst); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036
(R.I. 1982) (involving a boy who hanged himself after watching a hanging stunt on "The Tonight
Show"); Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (involving a 9-year-old girl who was sexually assaulted
by a group of minors after the group viewed a similar scene on a made-for-television movie);
Zamora, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (involving a 15-year-old who, after he shot and killed
his ,elderly neighbor, then sued the networks on the basis that he had become desensitized to
violence after ten years of watching television).
119. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
120. See cases cited in note 118.
121. Recall Justice Stewart's infamous statement in Jacobellis v. Ohio: "I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly [defining obscenity]. But I know it when I see it." 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963)
(Stewart concurring).
122. Richard Quaresima, Comment, Protection of First Amendment Freedom of Speech and
Expression Does Not Extend to Music Lyrics Judicially Determined to be Obscene, 22 Rutgers L.
J. 505, 523 (1991).
123. For example, one lower court describes the value of the First Amendment as follows:
The importance of the First Amendment to our freedoms as a whole cannot be overempha-
sized. It is the lens through which the operations of government are viewed and the support
and protection for the commentary which may result. Thus any action, legislative or other-
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First Amendment only protects political speech; thus, the notion of
freedom of all types of expression is a fallacy.124 Other commentators
argue that the First Amendment is an absolute guarantee of the right to
say anything, at any time, and in any place. 125 Under this view, the
First Amendment is unqualified; the text itself states that government
shall make "no law." Therefore, no Fourteenth Amendment analysis is
necessary-states may not limit expression regardless of the procedural
safeguards or limited circumstances. The Supreme Court appears to
value free speech as a fundamental right 12 6 included within the concept
of liberty,2 1 which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 28
The Constitution, however, is filled with competing interests and
rights, 29 some of which conflict at times. Thus, it is unrealistic and im-
practical to declare that states may never limit free speech. At the same
time, free speech is a right fundamental to American society and states
must be careful in applying restrictions. Courts try to balance these
competing concerns by applying a Fourteenth Amendment analysis to
state restrictions on speech. 30
In order to determine how much process is due before a state
abridges freedom of expression, the Supreme Court applies an ends-
means analysis. 131 The level of scrutiny it applies varies according to
the importance of the interests at stake.'32 When a fundamental right
such as freedom of expression is at issue, the state must show that it
has a compelling interest for the regulation, and that it has narrowly
wise [sic] which has as its purpose placing limitations upon freedom of expression must be
viewed with suspicion.
Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 203.
124. See note 55 and accompanying text.
125. See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-7 (Random House,
1970). See also note 91 and accompanying text.
126. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines
Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676
(1968).
127. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952).
128. The Fourteenth Amendment states that no State shall "deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
129. See Mark Schadrack, Privacy and the Press: A Necessary Tension, 18 Loyola L.A. L.
Rev. 949 (1985).
130. The Fourteenth Amendment analysis is appropriate because freedom of speech and of
the press is implicit in the concept of liberty, which may not be deprived without due process of
law. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 500.
131. See, for example, Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 50-54 (cited in note 24); Kent D. Lollis,
Strict or Benign Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause: Troublesome Areas Remain, 35
S.L.U. L. J. 93 (1990); Stephen T. Parascandola, There's Trouble in Paradise ... The Supreme
Court Weakens Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 17 Stetson L. Rev. 549 (1988).
132. Lollis, 35 S.L.U. L. J. at 110.
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tailored the limitation to fit the interest."' 3 The Court should apply
close scrutiny to any law that attempts to regulate speech.1 34
V. STATE INTERESTS IN PROMULGATING VIOLENCE STATUTES
In determining the constitutionality of restrictions on expression,
the Court must determine what constitutes a "compelling interest" for
legislation and whether the restrictions' means of attaining this interest
have a sufficiently close fit with the ends. With respect to the violence
acts, the states allegedly have three compelling interests at stake.
A. Regulating Morality
Legal theorists maintain an ongoing debate concerning the proper
role of morality in governmental regulations.13 5 This debate is even
stronger when a fundamental right is at stake. Whenever a government
makes a law it is defining societal morality. For example, in some socie-
ties cannibalism is not illegal..3 6 Perhaps a nation ought to limit legis-
lating morality to instances where laws are necessary to effect societal
order and to prevent physical harm to its members.
When the Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment does
not protect obscene publications, it was engaging in judicial moraliz-
ing. 3 7 Arguably, allowing the .Court to define American morals is even
worse than legislative moralizing, since the Court is not necessarily rep-
resentative of American society. However, both judicial and legislative
moralizing violate the text and the intent of the Bill of Rights, which
values the viewpoint of every individual, not just those of the
majority.138
133. Id. at 113.
134. See Stone, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 46. The Supreme Court's list of exceptions to the First
Amendment, see note 55 and accompanying text, which it classifies as "low value" speech, does not
comport with the Due Process analysis it applies to what it deems "protected" speech. Rather than
developing exceptions to the forms of speech that are protected by the First Amendment by deem-
ing such forms of slight social value, such value to be determined by the nine unelected justices
sitting on the Court, the Court should use a Fourteenth Amendment analysis for all forms of
speech. Under such a system, the Court would find that certain statutes regulating forms of
speech, such as obscenity, serve a compelling government interest, with the means to effectuate
such interest narrowly tailored to that end.
135. See John F. Murphy, Clandestine Warfare: Morality and Practical Problems Con-
founded, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 377 (1982).
136. See Gerald Scott, Romancing the Stone Age; Papua New Guinea is Paradise for Ocean
View Assistant Coach Randy Karcher, L.A. Times 3-17 (Mar. 8, 1986).
137. For a discussion of the propriety of judicial moralizing, see John B. McArthur, Aban-
doning the Constitution: The New Wave in Constitutional Theory, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 280, 291
(1984).
138. In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), the Court struck down
a state statute's prohibition of the exhibition of obscene, indecent, or immoral films as it was
applied to censor a film that favorably portrayed adultery:
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If legislating morality is not a compelling governmental interest,
then any statute seeking to regulate violent speech because of its slight
social value is unconstitutional since it deprives a person of a funda-
mental right without due process of law.
B. Preventing Incitement
One crucial difference exists between statutes that regulate obscene
speech and those which limit violent speech. The government's objec-
tive in enacting obscenity laws is the achievement of a legislatively-de-
fined level of societal morality.13 9 States may have this same goal when
regulating violent speech, in which case such regulations should not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.140 However, states may have another
legitimate and compelling interest in regulating violent speech. If so,
such regulations may withstand constitutional scrutiny, whereas ob-
scenity regulations should not. This compelling governmental interest is
the state's desire to protect its citizens from violent acts.'41
Feminist theorists argue that states must regulate obscenity not
due to abstract notions of morality, but rather because such forms of
expression lead to the commission of violent acts against women.' 42
Thus, the compelling interest such statutes seek to achieve is not legis-
lating morality, but rather curtailing criminal violence. State legisla-
tures and the Supreme Court, however, have not determined that the
purpose behind obscenity statutes is the prevention of violence. Addi-
tionally, feminist theorists have not produced sufficiently persuasive
data to substantiate their claim that obscenity leads to violence against
women.
1 43
It is contended that the State's action was justified because the motion picture attractively
portrays a relationship which is contrary to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and
the legal code of its citizenry. This argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution
protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be
proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas it
protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.
Id. at 688-89 (emphasis added).
139. Feminist theorists, however, argue that obscene speech, and pornography in general, is
properly subjected to governmental regulation because such expression sanctions and condones
violence against women. See Hoffman, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 498 (cited in note 92); Caryn Jacobs,
Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7 Harv.
Women's L. J. 5, 9-23 (1984). See also notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
140. See Part V.A.
141. See generally Hoffman, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 497.
142. See note 139.
143. Some commentators argue that the legislature does not need data to support its deci-
sions. See Hoffman, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 501 n.25. Without such a requirement, however, when a
fundamental interest such as freedom of expression is involved close scrutiny of the restrictions
would become impossible.
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The violence statutes more clearly involve the less controversial
governmental interest in preventing the occurrence of violent crimes.
States enacting these statutes do so based on the theory that violent
speech tends to incite the occurrence of violent crimes. In Brandenburg
v. Ohio,'" the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not
protect speech that incites violent crimes if two conditions are met: the
speech advocating violence is directed toward incitement, and it is
likely to produce such action.145 In Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District,46 the Court invalidated a school district policy that
prevented students from wearing black armbands in protest against the
Vietnam War. The school district claimed that wearing the armbands
would cause disturbances among the students. The Court declared that
something more than a fear of a disturbance is needed before the school
district may curtail expression constitutionally. 147
Commentators debate the effects of violent expression on the audi-
ence, especially violence portrayed on television. 48 Some claim that
such expression causes desensitivity to violence and the occurrence of
criminal acts of violence.14 9 Courts thus far have not found a direct line
of causation between violent expression and criminal acts. 50 One of the
problems in finding causation is statistical: thousands of people may
have watched a particular program, but only one viewer reacted vio-
lently.' 51 The grant of free speech encompasses the idea that states can-
144. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
145. The Court stated:
[Tjhe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.... [T]he mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral neces-
sity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action
and steering it to such action.
Id. at 447-48 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
146. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
147. Id. at 508. "The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was
reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the arm-
bands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id.
148. Compare Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1123 (1978) (condemning regu-
lation of television violence) with James A. Albert, Constitutional Regulation of Televised Vio-
lence, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1299 (1978) (favoring regulation of television violence).
149. See, for example, Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 200-01.
150. See note 118 and accompanying text.
151. "There may be some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is
an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional values, a governmental
power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of
expression." Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 205 (citations omitted).
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not punish the act of expressing, but only the one whose conduct,
separated from expression, violates the law.'52
The regulation of violent speech serves a more compelling interest
than do limitations on obscene speech. The ends in regulating obscenity
are intangible, moral goals,153 while the end in regulating violence is the
prevention of physical harm. However, because First Amendment free-
doms are so vulnerable to disintegration when the Court begins to carve
out exceptions to protected speech, the Court should not declare that
violent expression is not subject to constitutional protections because of
its "low value. 154 Rather, all speech is constitutionally protected; states
may deprive its citizens of this liberty interest only through strict con-
formity with procedures consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment.155
This requires an ends-means analysis under the courts' close scrutiny.
Preventing violent criminal acts is a compelling governmental in-
terest. Without clear empirical evidence 56 showing that violent expres-
sion in fact causes the occurrence of violent acts, however, states cannot
narrowly tailor the means contained in statutory restrictions on violent
speech. Thus, violence statutes will fail constitutional muster under
close scrutiny. 57 The First Amendment is too fundamental to allow any
152. See Whitney u. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, 378 (1927) (stating that "advocacy of vio-
lence, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advo-
cacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on," and that "[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights
of free speech and assembly"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (stating that "since there
was no evidence or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were in-
tended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished
by the state on the ground that they had 'a tendency to lead to violence' ") (citation omitted). See
also Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93; Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206.
153. But see Hoffman, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 497-98 (cited in note 114).
154. See note 113 and accompanying text.
155. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986). The court stated that "yet all is protected as speech, however insidious. Any
other answer leaves the government in control of all of the institutions of culture, the great censor
and director of which thoughts are good for us." Id.
156. Considerable disagreement surrounds the role of statistical data in examining a legisla-
tive enactment. For arguments favoring the need for such an examination, see Suzanne Rosen-
crans, Fighting Films: A First Amendment Analysis of Censorship of Violent Motion Pictures, 14
Columbia-VLA J. of L. & Arts 451, 452 (1990) (stating that "without empirical data to substanti-
ate the alleged causal connection between violence witnessed on screen and imminent violence
perpetrated in society at large, the task of formulating a constitutionally workable test is nearly
impossible"); Hoffman, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 501 n.25 (claiming that the Supreme Court will at
times use empirical evidence in constitutional analysis, although in obscenity cases it avoids doing
so).
157. In Zamora the district court recognized the possibility of scientific causation data being
produced: "One day, medical or other sciences with or without the cooperation of programmers
may convince the F.C.C. or the Courts that the delicate balance of First Amendment rights should
be altered to permit some additional limitations in programming." 480 F. Supp. at 206-07.
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less stringent examination of governmental restrictions on expression.
One of the philosophies that separates American society from others is
a citizen's absolute right to propagate opinions that the government
finds wrong, or even hateful.158 The evidence that violent expression
may lead to violent behavior 159 is thus insufficient to justify limitations
on a right as fundamental to American society and values as is the free-
dom of speech.160
C.- Protecting Children
While children have a right to freedom of speech, this right is in
tension with the States' interest in protecting children's health, welfare,
and safety."'1 States must also carefully limit any regulation that re-
stricts expressive material available to children so as not to violate the
rights of the adult public. For instance, in Butler v. Michigan16 2 the
Court considered a Michigan statute that made it a misdemeanor to sell
any book to the general public which contained obscene language tend-
ing to corrupt youths' morals. The Court did not deny that protecting
the general welfare of children is a compelling governmental interest.
However, the Court held that the statute in question was not narrowly
tailored to achieve this interest,163 and was thus unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause.
158. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327-28.
159. See Krattenmaker and Powe, 64 Va. L. Rev. at 1134 (cited in note 148).
160. See Bill v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1982), in which a minor sued a film
producer for injuries received outside a theater after a showing of the defendant's film. The plain-
tiff claimed that the defendant should have known his film would attract people with violent
proclivities. In rejecting the plaintiff's claims, the court stated:
It is an unfortunate fact that in our society there are people who will react violently to mov-
ies, or other forms of expression, which offend them, whether the subject matter be gangs,
race relations, or the Vietnam war. It may, in fact, be difficult to predict what particular
expression will cause such a reaction, and under what circumstances. To impose upon the
producers of a motion picture the sort of liability for which plaintiffs contend in this case
would, to a significant degree, permit such persons to dictate, in effect, what is shown in the
theaters of our land.
137 Cal. App. 3d at 1008-09.
161. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). The Ginsberg Court also declared that
the state has an interest in protecting children's morals. Id. This Note rejects this proposition. See
Part V.A.
162. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
163. The Butler Court declared: "The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general
reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile
innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the
house to roast the pig.... We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of
Michigan to reading only what is fit for children." Id. at 383. See also Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957) (finding that limitation of speech is the exception and must be
closely confined to preclude licensing or censorship).
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In order to balance the right to free speech with the varying de-
grees of governmental interests at stake, the Supreme Court has al-
lowed states to apply a variable definition of obscenity-one definition
that is applicable to adults and a second that is applicable to minors.164
In Ginsberg v. New York, 65 the Court proclaimed that the Constitution
does not forbid a state from placing more restrictions on children's
rights to read or view sexually explicit publications than it places on
adults' rights.66 The Court's conclusion rested on two grounds: (1) the
legislature was not usurping the role of parents in rearing their chil-
dren, but rather it was merely providing a law to support and respect
the role of parental guidance, and (2) the State itself has an interest in
promoting the general welfare of its children and their progression into
citizenship. 167
The Supreme Court thus allows a state's legitimate interest in the
well-being of its children to override the children's constitutional guar-
antees with seemingly little scrutiny.1 68 This lack of adequate judicial
examination violates children's constitutional rights to due process of
law. When an individual's fundamental interest is at stake, the govern-
ment must show that any restrictive regulation serves a compelling in-
terest and that the regulation's means are narrowly tailored to fit these
ends-all subject to the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny. When a funda-
mental right requiring close scrutiny is at stake, the legislature must
produce sufficient data to show that the governmental interest is in fact
164. See 352 U.S. at 380.
165. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). At issue was the constitutionality of a New York statute barring
sales of "girlie" magazines to minors. Id. at 631.
166. Id. at 636-37.
It is enough for the purposes of this case that we inquire whether it was constitutionally
impermissible for New York... to accord minors under 17 a more restricted right than that
assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or
see. We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of freedom of expres-
sion constitutionally secured to minors.
Id. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
167. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-41.
168. According to the Ginsberg Court:
[T]he law states a legislative finding that the material condemned by [it] is 'a basic factor
in impairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear and present danger
to the people of the state.' It is very doubtful that this finding expresses an accepted scientific
fact.... To sustain state power to exclude material defined as obscenity by [the statute]
requires only that we be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.... But the growing
consensus of commentators is that 'while these studies all agree that a causal link has not
been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either.
390 U.S. at 641-42 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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compelling, that the means will accomplish the objective and that the
means are the least restrictive manner of achieving the end.169
The Court corrected the deficiencies in the Ginsberg rationale with
its reasoning in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC.170 In Sable, the
contested federal statute regulated telephone services such as "Dial-A-
Porn."' 7 ' The Court divided its analysis into two parts: one upheld the
ban on obscene commercial telephone messages and the other struck
down the same prohibition as applied to indecent messages.
The Sable Court's analysis made apparent the precedental dangers
inherent in decisions relating to fundamental rights such as freedom of
speech. When examining the constitutionality of the regulation as ap-
plied to obscene speech, the Court simply noted that the First Amend-
ment does not protect such expression.1 2 When it began its analysis of
indecent telephone messages, the Court was quick to note that it had
not previously stated that the Constitution does not protect indecent
speech.'73 The Court recognized that states have a compelling and legit-
imate interest in protecting minors from indecent speech, but held that
the means employed were not narrowly tailored to fit the ends.
Obscene speech does not even receive the limited protection this
balancing test provides-it is completely excluded from First Amend-
ment protections.'714 This result is not due to any constitutional text or
any congressional amendment; nor is it because each obscenity statute
has passed a test in which a court has found a compelling governmental
interest and a narrowly tailored regulation designed to meet this inter-
est. The Constitution does not protect obscene speech simply because
the Supreme Court and most of society considers it to be without value.
In holding the statute's ban of indecent telephone messages uncon-
stitutional, the Court distinguished its holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation.'7 5 The Pacifica Court upheld a time regulation on indecent
broadcasts. The Sable Court emphasized that courts must construe
Pacifica narrowly, and found Pacifica distinguishable on two grounds:
(1) broadcasting is unique since it can enter one's home without prior
169. The Ginsberg Court disagreed with this proposition: "[W]e do not demand of legisla-
tures 'scientifically certain criteria of legislation.'" Id. at 642-43 (citation omitted).
170. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
171. Section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 was amended as of November 1989
to initiate a complete ban of indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. 47
U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. 1990).
172. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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warning as to its content;17 and (2) it is uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read.17 7
Thus, the factors the Court looks at in determining whether a regu-
lation of children's speech is constitutionally sound are: minors' accessi-
bility to the expressive material, 8 whether minors are a captive
audience,179 whether the regulation incidentally restricts expression
protected as to adults,180 whether the government is infringing on the
role of parents in rearing their children, 8" whether it is a reasonable
time, place or manner restriction, 82 whether other solutions less intru-
sive on First Amendment freedoms are plausible, 8" and arguably
whether appropriate legislative findings have been made. 84
In Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster, 85 the Eighth
Circuit struck down the Missouri violence act despite the state's alleged
purpose of protecting the welfare of minors. The court reasoned that
while the state has more control over the content of speech aimed at
children than speech aimed at adults, children still have the right to
freedom of speech under the First Amendment. 8 6 The court noted that
since the Supreme Court has not held that violent speech is unpro-
tected by the Constitution, the state must narrowly tailor any legisla-
tion regulating violent expression directed toward young people to
further the state's interest in the welfare of minors without unnecessa-
rily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. 8 7 The court concluded
that because the statute did not narrowly define the type of violent ex-
pression being proscribed, the legislation was unconstitutionally
overbroad."88
Protecting children is a compelling governmental interest, and
under a sufficiently narrow statute, censorship of expression available to
children may be constitutionally permissible. 8" Empirical data shows
176. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
177. Id. See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
178. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
179. Id. at 748-49.
180. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
181. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
182. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
183. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128. See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50.
184. But see Sable, 492 U.S. at 129 (stating that "[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot
limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake") (quoting Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)).
185. 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
186. Id. at 688-89.
187. Id. at 689.
188. Id. at 690.
189. Compare Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981).
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that children sometimes mimic violence portrayed on television.1 °
However, these studies show that only certain groups of children tend
to experience increased aggression after viewing televised violence.191
Furthermore, imitative behavior varies according to a child's age. For
example, violent programs are less likely to affect teenagers. 192 There-
fore, under close scrutiny, the violence statutes are overbroad for failure
to take these factors into account.
Violence statutes may be constitutional if state legislatures adopt a
"reasonable child standard." The definition of child would only include
those younger than thirteen, and the regulation would limit its coverage
to the types of violence that children are likely to imitate.193 In order to
survive Due Process scrutiny, however, supporters of the regulation
must produce sufficient reliable data showing that the specific violent
expression tends to cause harm to children.
VI. THE LACK OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Before a state may alter or limit any First Amendment rights, it
must follow certain procedures.19 4 Although private booksellers and
video dealers implement the violence acts, their decisions are enforced
under the color of state law, and thus constitute acts of the state within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 As a preliminary matter,
the Supreme Court has declared that the burden lies on the party desir-
ing the censorship to prove that the Constitution does not protect the
speech.' 96 Under the theory articulated herein, all speech is constitu-
tionally protected but subject to limitation if, under close scrutiny, the
government has a compelling interest and the regulation's means are
narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. Therefore, the censor must
carry the burden of proving these elements.
Second, the Court has declared that a restraint imposed prior to a
judicial determination on the matter is constitutionally permissible only
190. Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Comm. on Television and Social Behavior, Televi-
sion and Growing Up: The Impact of Televised Violence, Report to the Surgeon General 122-25
(1972) (hereinafter "Surgeon General's Report").
191. Id. "For some children, under some conditions, some television is harmful. For other
children under the same conditions, or for the same children under other conditions, it may be
beneficial. For most children, under most conditions, most television is probably neither particu-
larly harmful nor particularly beneficial." E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. and Lisa A. Hook, The Con-
trol of Media-Related Imitative Violence, 38 Fed. Comm. L. J. 317, 354 (1987) (quoting Surgeon
General's Report at 20.
192. See Prettyman and Hook, 38 Fed. Comm. L. J. at 327.
193. A bill along these lines was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1973.
See id. at 330-31 n.55.
194. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57-58; Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 65-66.
195. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 68.
196. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
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if two requirements are met: 1) the restraint must be limited to preserv-
ing the status quo; and 2) the restraint must be imposed only for the
shortest time necessary for judicial resolution of the matter. 197 The vio-
lence acts fail this test. The acts require booksellers and video dealers
to remove from their shelves any material they feel may meet the vague
statutory definition of "violent" expression. Their other options are
placing the materials on "binder racks" where minors supposedly can-
not see them, not allowing minors into the store, or covering the covers
of the books and videos.'98 Whichever choice is made, the effect is a
drastic change of the status quo without a judicial determination that
the suppression of a particular work serves a compelling governmental
interest. In fact, the Due Process rights of authors of particular books
or producers and writers of particular films on video cassettes are vio-
lated unless a court reviews the decision for each particular restricted
work. Such a result is neither desirable nor feasible. The effect would
be to make courts censors199 of the material available to the general
public, since restricting access to children would have the incidental ef-
fect of limiting access to adults. 00
A final aspect of Due Process analysis inquires into the clarity of
the regulation.20 1 The degree of ambiguity that constitutionally will be
permissible varies according to the importance of the interests at
stake.02 As applied to the First Amendment, the statute must pass
strict standards of vagueness, due to the potential for an inhibiting ef-
fect on speech.20' "[A] man may the less be required to act at his peril
here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser. '204
VII. CONCLUSION
Statutes that attempt to restrict the availability of expressive ma-
terial to the public bear a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.
Courts must carefully scrutinize any such restrictions in order to pro-
tect against the gradual disintegration of a right deemed fundamental
to the proper functioning of American society. The emergence of vio-
197. Id. at 59.
198. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 25 (cited in note 43).
199. In Freedman, the Court stated: "The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judi-
cial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of ex-
pression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final
restraint." 380 U.S. at 58.
200. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 71.
201. See Smith, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
202. See id. at 150-51.
203. Id. at 151.
204. Id. (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948)).
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lence statutes represents the most recent threat to the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech.
Because the Constitution contains abundant competing rights and
interests, it cannot be said that the right to express oneself freely and
to freely receive communications from other members of society is an
absolute guarantee, never subject to abatement or suspension. In order
to determine when such a fundamental right constitutionally may be
subject to regulation, the Supreme Court has developed certain proce-
dures that must be followed, consonant with the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The procedures delineated in the violence statutes do not survive
close scrutiny. It is debatable whether these restrictions are in fact an
attempt to implement the values of a majority as to what expressive
material is suitable for society. While the statutes on their face are
aimed at protecting children's welfare, they may also be viewed as an
attempt to impose a new set of values on those who represent the coun-
try's future. Additionally, since an indirect effect of the statutes is to
restrict the expressive material that is available to adults, the regula-
tions may in fact be intended to impose a majority's definition of mo-
rality on the general public.
Nevertheless, it is also possible that the violence acts could be a
bona fide attempt to reduce the number and degree of acts of violence
upon society. Such an end to a statute is a compelling governmental
interest, and if the means of attaining such an interest are narrowly
tailored to achieve this end the right to free expression may be
subordinated.
The means set forth in the violence statutes, however, do not ap-
proach the degree of precision necessary for a restriction on the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech to survive a constitutional at-
tack. Booksellers and video dealers are required to be censors for the
general public. They are not provided with any guidelines to determine
whether a particular material falls under the statute's terms. No possi-
bility exists for judicial review of every bookseller's and every video
dealer's determination of "violent" or "acceptable." Most importantly,
researchers have not produced sufficient data to conclude that violent
expression in fact causes violent actions by those who read, view, or
listen to it. Absent such a connection, the violence statutes cannot sur-
vive close scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom of
speech is a liberty not to be denied without due process, and such pro-
cess must first include a determination that the compelling governmen-
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tal interest apparent on the face of a statute is in fact implicated and
possibly achieved by way of the restriction on expression.
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